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A B S T R A C T
This article explores one aspect of the many public protests surrounding the
1996 reform of German orthography: the first in a series of legal chal-
lenges, which was brought before the Federal Constitutional Court in May
1996. The first section begins by proposing how and why such protests can
be usefully theorized in terms of Blommaert’s (1999) concept of a “language
ideological debate,” and then describes the historical background essential
for an understanding of this legal dispute. The second section focuses on a
critical analysis of the case brought against the reform, looking at the details
of the challenge itself, together with the justification for its rejection by the
Constitutional Court. The third section considers what this dispute can tell
us about debates over the perceived origin of orthographic norms, with par-
ticular reference to the ideological relationship between individual, speech
community, and (nation-)state. Finally, there is a brief summary of the way
in which the matter was finally – albeit unsatisfactorily – resolved in 1998–
1999. (Orthography, spelling reform, language ideological debates, stan-
dardization, linguistic norms, German language, late modernity.)*
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In late 1995, a press release by the German Standing Conference of Ministers
for Education and Cultural Affairs – the Kultusministerkonferenz or KMK –
announced that a reform of German orthography had been approved. The pro-
posed changes were an attempt to harmonize what was perceived to be a com-
plex and inconsistent set of orthographic rules that caused unnecessary problems
for language users of all ages, but particularly for young schoolchildren. The
reform was to be introduced from 1 August 1998 to coincide with the start of
the new school year, and this would be followed by a seven-year transitional
period until 2005, during which time the old orthography would be considered
“outdated” (überholt) but not “wrong” ( falsch). However, many Federal states,
or Bundesländer, chose not to delay the implementation of the reform until
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1998 and instructed schools in their areas to begin teaching the new rules from
the start of the school year 199607.
The decision to reform German orthography had not been taken lightly. The
first, and hitherto only, set of official guidelines for all the German-speaking
countries had been agreed to in 1901. The final proposal for their revision in 1996
was the result of almost a century of often heated debate among educationalists,
linguists, politicians, writers, journalists, and other interested parties. Nor was
the 1996 reform an exclusively German affair: From the late 1970s in particular,
there had been close liaison between what were then the four main German-
speaking states – the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Re-
public, Austria, and Switzerland – with the reform process facilitated to some
extent by the unification of Germany in 1990. At various points, there had also
been input from Liechtenstein, the only other country with German as its sole
official language, and from German-speaking groups in Belgium, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Italy, Romania, and Hungary. On 1 July 1996, representatives from
many of these countries, together with German, Austrian, and Swiss officials,
met in Vienna to sign the so-called Viennese Declaration of Intent, or Wiener
Absichtserklärung, thereby agreeing to implement the new guidelines.
Although the disputes surrounding the state-sanctioned standardization of
German orthography had never entirely abated since they first began in the
mid-19th century, by the time the Viennese Declaration was signed in 1996, a
new round of protests had already been gathering momentum. In May of that
year, Rolf Gröschner, professor of law at the University of Jena, and his 14-
year-old daughter took their case against the reform to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, or Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in Karlsruhe. Although the
court rejected their claim that the reform was at odds with the “German Basic
Law” (Grundgesetz), their highly publicized campaign helped to rekindle what
can probably be characterized as traditional public antipathy toward the idea of
orthographic reform. In October 1996, a group of eminent writers and intellec-
tuals, including the Nobel laureate Günter Grass, signed a petition circulated at
the annual Frankfurt Book Fair by the Bavarian schoolteacher Friedrich Denk;
this protest attracted considerable media coverage, culminating in a cover story
in the German news magazine Der Spiegel (14 October 1996). In November
1996, Denk then went on to form a national “citizens’ action group” (Bürger-
initiative), entitled “WE [the people] against the spelling reform” (WIR gegen
die Rechtschreibreform), the aim of which was to topple the reform via a series
of regional referendums (see Johnson 1999, 2000).
T H E O R E T I C A L A N D H I S T O R I C A L C O N T E X T
Language ideological debates
In this article, I propose that the 1996 reform of German orthography and the
public protests it inspired are a prime example of what Blommaert 1999 has
S A L LY J O H N S O N
550 Language in Society 31:4 (2002)
called a language ideological debate. Blommaert (1999:1–12) describes
such debates as occurring in specific times and places where real social actors
have collectively disputed the nature and function of language. These social ac-
tors, or ideological brokers, can be then said to have engaged in the produc-
tion and reproduction of language ideologies, “sets of beliefs about language
articulated by users as a rationalisation or justification of perceived language
structure and use” (Silverstein 1979:193). At the same time, such ideological
brokering can be theorized in terms of “bids” for authoritative entextual-
ization (Silverstein & Urban 1996:11) – as concrete attempts to secure closure
in a given debate, whereby a particular language ideology would eventually come
to be seen as more or less natural and inevitable (Blommaert 1999:9).
Writing at the beginning of the 1990s, Woolard notes that “the topic of lan-
guage ideology may be one much-needed bridge between work on language struc-
ture and language politics, as well as between linguistic and social theory”
(1992:236). However, Blommaert’s point of departure for the analysis of lan-
guage ideological debates is his contention that, although there is now a sub-
stantial literature on language ideology generally (see, inter alia, Joseph & Taylor
1990, Kroskrity, Schieffelin & Woolard 1992, Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity
1998, Kroskrity 2000), and historians of language have similarly touched upon
related issues, “the historiography of language ideologies is something
that remains to be constructed” (1999:1, emphasis in original). In any attempt to
understand how and why some views of language gradually emerge as dominant
while others are suppressed and marginalized, we need to attend to the histori-
cal processes that inform the dynamics of social power as these obtain in spe-
cific debates over language (see also Milroy 2001).
Central to the historiographical approach advocated by Blommaert is the re-
jection of an “idealist” view of language that treats phenomena such as attitudes
and ideologies as something language users merely “have,” since this results not
only in their de-historicization but also in the mystification of the power pro-
cesses underpinning them. Instead, Blommaert argues for a particular type of
materialist view of language, which entails “an ethnographic eye for the real
historical actors, their interests, their alliances, their practices, and where they
come from, in relation to the discourses they produce” (1999:7). This, in turn,
allows the theorist to expose the historical contingency of ideational phenomena,
thereby contributing to their demystification. Such an approach does not, how-
ever, posit ideologies as coherent belief systems somehow epistemologically coun-
terpoised to the “truth,” but rather as a convergence of multiple and fluid
“discourses that have specific consequences for relations of power at all levels
of social relationships” (Barker & Galasinski 2001:66, emphasis in original). In
this sense, all individuals and social groups hold ideologically informed be-
liefs – linguistic or otherwise – but “the difference between the dominant and
subordinate groups is one of degrees of power and differing substantive world
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views, not of ideological versus non-ideological ideas” (Barker & Galasinski
2001:66).1
Afocus on orthography lends itself particularly well to the kind of historical-
materialist approach to language ideologies advocated by Blommaert. Moreover,
it is in tune with an emerging sociolinguistic literature that emphasizes the con-
tingent nature of orthographic practices generally. Sebba (1998a:35– 40), for ex-
ample, describes how the dominant view of orthography has traditionally been
that of a neutral, technical accomplishment the primary function of which is little
more than the “reduction of speech to writing.” Yet, drawing on Street’s (1984)
distinction between “autonomous” and “ideological” views of literacy, Sebba
argues that an autonomous approach to orthography similarly masks the deeply
ideological nature of the choices made by real social actors in the historical de-
velopment of writing conventions. In his study of British Creole, for example,
Sebba 1998a illustrates the ways in which a number of writers of Caribbean
origin have tried to capture in written form a variety of speech for which there is
no standard orthography. Especially interesting are the choices made by such
writers in those cases where there is no phonemic motivation for adopting a
spelling that diverges from that of the lexifier language, English, e.g. ^tuff& ‘tough’
or ^dhu0duh& ‘do’ (Sebba 1998a:27). This suggests that Caribbean writers are
choosing spellings that will actually construct a difference between British
Creole and standard English in order to emphasize their own distinctiveness from
mainstream cultural practices.
Similar uses of orthography as a means of styling both Self and Other in de-
bates over ethnic, regional, and0or national identities have been explored in the
context of Scots English (McClure 1985), Indonesian and Malaysian (Vikør 1988),
English Creole in Trinidad and Tobago (Winer 1990), Louisiana French (Brown
1993), Haitian Creole (Schieffelin & Doucet 1994), Manx (Sebba 1998b), Nor-
folk dialect (Trudgill 1999), and Corsican (Jaffe 1999). And whereas Clark &
Ivanic (1997:195–211) critically explore the use of spelling and punctuation as a
means of disciplining language users at school and beyond whereas Kress 2000
focuses on the emergent writing practices of young children as these attempt to
marry the desire to use orthography as an expression of personal creativity, on the
one hand, with the pressure to conform to mainstream practices, on the other (see
also Kataoka 1997). Finally, in a special edition of the Journal of Sociolinguis-
tics, Jaffe 2000 and her contributors (Androutsopoulos, Miethaner, Jaffe and Wal-
ton, Berthele, and Preston) explore many of the assumptions underpinning the
use of nonstandard orthographies as a means of representing nonstandard speech,
thereby highlighting the ideological nature of transcription processes more gen-
erally in the construction, conscious or otherwise, of social identities.
Inevitably, perhaps, much of this recent work in sociolinguistics and linguistic
anthropology tends to focus on orthographic practices in the context of emergent,
nonstandard, or endangered varieties of written language, since these present
particularly exciting opportunities for observing the production of ideologies,
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and the construction of social identities, against the backdrop of an often tense
relationship with mainstream standards. Such opportunities are arguably less ev-
ident, however, when we consider varieties of written language that are already
highly standardized and widely used, for it is here that what Milroy & Milroy
1999 refer to as “standard language ideology” is probably at its most pervasive
(see also Milroy 2001). And even though, as Cameron (1995:39) has noted in her
discussion of the “politics of style,” standardization processes can never be en-
tirely finished; once a standard variety has been widely accepted, diffused, pre-
scribed, and codified, to use Haugen’s (1972) classic terms, notions of orthographic
(in)correctness can appear so utterly self-evident that their status as common
sense is often considered literally beyond debate. Therefore, it is perhaps pri-
marily when such conventions are subject to a form of re-standardization (Schiff-
man 1998:362; Joseph 1987:174), as in the 1996 reform of German, that popular
awareness of the contingency of everyday usage resurfaces, and language ideo-
logical debates in the public domain are triggered once again (Vikør 1988).
The 1996 reform: Historical background
The explicit involvement of state authorities in questions of German orthography
dates back to the mid-19th century, when differing guidelines were first drawn up
for schools in various parts of the German-speaking areas (Mentrup 1993:17–
18). With increasing importance accorded to dictation in the teaching of lan-
guage and literacy, the differences between these guidelines were inevitably a
problem for any pupil or teacher who moved from one area to another.2 But the
growing sense that something had to be done about such orthographical variabil-
ity was not motivated primarily by linguistic or even pedagogic considerations.
Despite the range of regional traditions, the ability of readers to decipher texts
from areas other than their own was largely unaffected, and within each area there
was still a high degree of orthographic consistency.As Sauer (1988:85) has noted,
the main impetus for the standardization of German orthography was political.
With the unification of the German Empire by Bismarck in 1871, and with con-
comitant attempts to build a modern nation-state, came the perceived need for
standardization in many areas of social life – currency, weights and measures,
postal services, railways, education, and the legal system – of which language,
including orthography, was an integral part.3
However, the process of reform would never be straightforward (see Schlaefer
1981). When the First Orthographic Conference of 1876 made its recommenda-
tions for the standardization and simplification of German orthography (see
Verhandlungen 1876), these were thwarted, not least by Bismarck himself, on the
grounds that the population was already having to cope with changes in so many
other areas of life in the wake of unification (Sauer 1988:87). When an agreement
was finally reached following the Second Orthographic Conference of 1901, the
outcome was less a comprehensive “reform” and more an endorsement of Konrad
Duden’s 1880 Complete Orthographical Dictionary of the German Language,
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which was based on the guidelines for Prussian and Bavarian schools.4 Indeed, it
was the nature of this compromise that led Duden himself to claim that the 1901
guidelines were only really an “intermediary step” (Zwischenziel ) on the path to
further reform (see Russ 1994:165). That the achievement of such a reform would
take almost another century is indicative of a paradox that surrounds orthography
generally: its commonly perceived insignificance, which meant that the ques-
tion of reform was repeatedly marginalized in favor of more pressing political
concerns (see Jansen-Tang 1988), coupled with its huge symbolic significance,
the popular and media expression of which was evident in the many public con-
troversies that accompanied both early reform attempts in the late 19th century
and the 100 or so proposals put forward throughout the 20th century (see Küppers
1984, Ledig 1999, Zabel 1989, 1996, 1997a).
Ironically, it was the actions of Duden himself that, from the outset, threatened
the ongoing process of standardization – or restandardization – he so fervently
desired. For example, in the seventh edition of his dictionary (1902), Duden al-
ready failed to adhere to many of the guidelines specified in the 1901 agreement.5
This trend was consolidated when, following his death in 1911, the general Duden
dictionary was merged with the separate printers’ Duden of 1907 to produce the
ninth edition of a single Duden in 1915. By this time, many of the inconsistencies
between the 1901 guidelines, the general Duden, and the printers’ Duden had
been ironed out, albeit frequently going against the 1901 proposals. In fact, as
Kohrt (1997:304) has noted, although the state was certainly responsible for an
initial fixing of a standard orthography, it was private enterprise that did much to
increase normativity, not least in areas where the state had itself preferred a
degree of liberalism. Kohrt shows, for example, how the Duden continued to play
a crucial role in the normification of areas either not covered by the 1901 guide-
lines (such as hyphenation and punctuation) or referred to only in general terms
(such as noun capitalization), or by simply eliminating optional variability (as in
the spelling of foreign loans). Kohrt therefore concludes that, by the late 20th
century, it was not so much the 1901 rules that were in need of reform but the
various modifications of those rules undertaken since that time (for further ex-
amples, see Sauer 1988:103–16).
After World War II and the division of Germany in 1949, it was especially
clear that the success of any proposal for orthographic reform would depend on
the agreement of all the German-speaking countries, although the first serious
international reform attempt, resulting in the Stuttgart Recommendations of 1954
(see Strunk 1992, 1998) failed amid widespread public and media protest (see
Küppers 1984:121–29). Moreover, by the end of that year, two separate versions
of the Duden dictionary were now being published, one in East Germany (Leipzig)
and one in the West (Mannheim). But it was the appearance in 1954 of a rival
dictionary, published by Bertelsmann in West Germany, that was to trigger a
landmark decision in the history of German orthography (see Augst & Strunk
1988). In 1955, the West German Duden editors turned to the Standing Confer-
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ence of Ministers for Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz or
KMK), asking for clarification of the situation vis-à-vis the norms of 1901. The
KMK formally ruled that until revised norms were available, the 1901 guidelines
would remain valid, but in “cases of uncertainty” (Zweifelsfälle), the supplemen-
tary rules contained in the Duden should be considered binding. In this way,
Duden – a private company – secured an unprecedented commercial monopoly in
the German dictionary market, thereby achieving its de facto status as the arbiter
of German orthography for the next four decades (see Augst & Strunk 1988).
Following the failure of the so-called Wiesbaden Recommendations of 1958
(see Strunk 1992, 1998), discussions on orthographic reform continued through-
out the 1960s and 1970s, not least in the context of the West German anti-
authoritarian student movement with its impassioned critique of the use of
orthography as a means of disciplining schoolchildren (see Jansen-Tang 1988:106–
21). In an education system where the teaching of German continues to make
extensive use of dictation (at least at the primary school level), and where all
pupils are required to “resit” whole school years should they fail their end-of-year
examinations, spelling reform coupled with a critique of dictation per se became
key components of attempts to eliminate discrimination against working-class
children, who were thought to have less contact with written German than their
middle-class counterparts.6 But it was not until the late 1970s, in the light of the
various proposals drawn up in East and West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland,
that there appeared to be sufficient common ground for an international agree-
ment on reform (see Hillinger & Nerius 1997, Blüml 1997, Looser & Sitta 1997,
Zabel 1997b). This led, in 1980, to the formation of the International Working
Party on Orthography (Internationaler Arbeitskreis für Orthographie) (see Zabel
1997c). Along with a series of interim meetings, three formal conferences of the
Working Party were held in Vienna in 1986, 1990, and 1994, known as the “First,
Second and Third Vienna Talks” (erste, zweite und dritte Wiener Gespräche), but
often collectively referred to as the Third Orthographic Conference (after 1876
and 1901).
Although the various proposals put forward by the Working Party were con-
tinually revised in the light of popular and media protest (see Zabel 1989, 1996),
by 1995 it looked as though a workable set of guidelines was finally available. In
November, the Standing Conference of Ministers for Education and Cultural Af-
fairs of the 16 Federal German States put out a press release announcing that the
German-speaking countries had reached agreement on what was formally known
as a “revision of the guidelines governing German orthography” (Neuregelung
der deutschen Rechtschreibung) (Kultusministerkonferenz 1995). The aim of those
revisions, it claimed, was to reduce the overall number of rules for spelling and
punctuation, and to eliminate some of the more general inconsistencies and errors
that had arisen over time. However, the press release did not mention two further,
and ultimately crucial, points. First, the new guidelines were legally binding only
for those areas of public life over which the Ministers for Education and Cultural
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Affairs had jurisdiction: schools and state authorities (Behörden). Second, ap-
proximating the procedure adopted in 1901 (see Augst & Strunk 1989), the re-
vised orthography was to be introduced in Germany via decrees (Erlasse) issued
by the Ministers for Education and CulturalAffairs of the individual federal states.
In other words, no statutory laws (Gesetze) were planned at the level of either the
regional parliaments (Länderparlamente or Landtage) or the national parliament
(Bundestag).7
The actual revisions to German orthography are too complex to be described
here in detail, but they can be categorized into six main groups, as follows:
(a) sound–letter classifications (e.g. KänguruhrKänguru ‘kangaroo’);
(b) compound spelling vs. separate words (e.g. radfahrenrRad fahren ‘to
cycle’);
(c) hyphenation (e.g. Hair-StylistrHairstylist/Hair-Stylist);
(d) capitalization (e.g. in bezug aufrin Bezug auf ‘with respect to’);
(e) punctuation (a considerable reduction in the number of punctuation rules);
(f ) the breaking of words at the ends of lines (e.g. Zuk-kerrZu-cker ‘sugar’).8
Although it was generally estimated that the orthographic revisions required to
an average text would amount to no more than approximately 0.5% (see Bundes-
verfassungsgericht 1998:239), their quantitative minimality did little to assuage
popular resistance. Indeed, for many opponents, the limited impact of the reform
was merely symptomatic of its general superfluity (see Ickler 1997), and by the
summer of 1996, public and particularly media expression of dissatisfaction was
once again widespread (see Ledig 1999, Zabel 1997a). Although there was prob-
ably very little that was new in the content of the arguments put forward during
this time (most, such as fears of a decline in the national cultural heritage, had
been made repeatedly since the 19th century), the year 1996 did appear to mark
a significant fusion of various forms of protest, which would continue over the
next two years and in some cases beyond.
T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L C H A L L E N G E O F 1 9 9 6
I now turn to an analysis of the first legal challenge brought before the Federal
Constitutional Court by Rolf Gröschner and his daughter in May 1996, consisting
in two requests for a temporary injunction to halt the ensuing introduction of the
reform. As a basis for my analysis, I shall critically discuss the document con-
taining the official ruling of the Court on these two cases, 1 BvR 1057/96 and 1
BvR 1067/96, which was published on 21 June 1996 (Bundesverfassungsgericht
1996). It is important to note, however, that in the years leading up to his petition,
the central complainant, Gröschner, acted as the supervisor of a doctoral disser-
tation on constitutional aspects of orthographic reform by Wolfgang Kopke (Ko-
pke 1995a). Many of the ideas underpinning Gröschner’s case draw directly upon
this thesis, the thrust of which is summarized in various papers (e.g. Gröschner
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1997, Gröschner & Kopke 1997, Kopke 1995b, 1996, 1997), and which has been
widely and critically discussed elsewhere (e.g., Hufeld 1996, Hufen 1997, Jäkel
1996, Knobloch 1998, Kolonovits 1997, Kranz 1998, Meder 1997, Menzel 1998,
Munske 1997, Rivers & Young 2001, Roellecke 1997, Roth 1999, Zabel 1996). I
will therefore expand on my discussion of the ruling in question with reference to
the relevant secondary literature.
The complaints
In the first section of his complaint (1.2.aa),9 Gröschner disputed the role being
played by the Duden dictionary in trying to secure the implementation of the
1996 reform. The Duden, as we saw earlier, was declared in 1955 by the West
German KMK to be binding in so-called cases of uncertainty until such time as a
reform of the 1901 guidelines had been agreed. Meanwhile, the KMK resolution
of 30 November 1995 had explicitly stated that the 1955 ruling would not be
revoked until 1 August 1998 (I.1c.9). Since, however, the individual Federal
states would be permitted to introduce the new guidelines at a time of their own
choosing in the two-year period between 1 August 1996 and 1 August 1998, and
an edition of the Duden dictionary revised according to the new regulations was
already planned for the summer of 1996, it was Gröschner’s contention that the
Duden would effectively function as a “lever” for the reform’s implementation
during this two-year transitionary period.
Kopke (1995a:48– 65, 1995b:878–80) has argued at length that the original
1955 ruling of the KMK almost certainly infringed the West German constitution
(or Basic Law), which was adopted by the newly unified German state in 1990.
For example, Article 12 of the Basic Law states that “The practice of trades and
professions may be regulated by law” – that is to say, only by law (see Grundgesetz
1998). By the early 1990s, however, anxious about the ensuing loss of their 40-
year monopoly, the Duden editors were especially eager to be seen publicly to
have played a central role in the new reform, thereby continuing to convey the
impression of the authoritative status of their dictionaries. For example, in a pam-
phlet outlining the new guidelines (Duden 1994), Duden declared their self-
appointed task of helping to secure the implementation of the reform; their editor-
in-chief, Günter Drosdowski, was happy to concede, in an interview in the news
magazine Der Spiegel (19 June 1995), the role of his company as the “long arm
of the state” in matters of orthography. All in all, Kopke was of the opinion that
the position of the Duden publishers vis-à-vis the state was itself in need of stat-
utory regulation – particularly because the 1996 reform was, in his view, tanta-
mount to a recommendation to the population by the state to purchase an
updated version of the Duden, in itself a potential further breach of Article 12.
Only through the full and open public discussion that would necessarily accom-
pany the drawing up of proper statutory legislation on the question of ortho-
graphic reform would other publishers, Kopke believed, be afforded their rightful
opportunity to compete openly with the Duden.10
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The additional three complaints put forward by Gröschner (I.2.bb) concerned
various claims that the 1996 reform of German orthography constituted an in-
fringement of his own constitutional rights as laid down in the Basic Law.
Gröschner maintained, first of all, that the reform, and the purportedly unlaw-
ful role played by the Duden in securing its implementation, were an infringe-
ment of Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that “everyone
has the right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does not
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral
code.” In addition, Gröschner cited Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law,
which states, “The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the
duty of all state authority.” It was Gröschner’s contention that the spelling reform
breached these rights because one of the basic conditions for the free develop-
ment of his personality was what he referred to as “linguistic integrity.” The
spelling reform, he argued, impinged on that integrity because he would eventu-
ally be required – not only in his professional capacity as a civil servant, but even
his private correspondence – to adopt the new orthographic rules in order to avoid
the “social embarrassment” that generally accompanies an inability to spell cor-
rectly.11 He therefore claimed that it was the duty of the state, as enshrined in
Article 1, to protect the dignity associated with such linguistic integrity.
Kopke (1995a:277–93, 1996:1082) further develops this notion of “linguistic
integrity” by arguing that, although Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law spe-
cifically guarantees the physical inviolability of the individual, Article 2, Para-
graph 1, taken together with Article 1, could also be interpreted as guaranteeing
psychological inviolability. Given the intrinsic relationship between language
and thought, an important component of such psychological inviolability would
then be linguistic integrity. Kopke (1996:1083) justifies this view as follows:
Article 5 of the constitution guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of ex-
pression in speech and writing. Although this has traditionally been interpreted in
terms of content, Kopke argues that such freedom could also be extended to the
form of expression – in this case, orthographic form. To justify this view, he
draws on recent research on written language and orthography that demonstrates
that writing is not merely, as traditionally maintained, a second-order represen-
tation of spoken language (underpinning the dictum “write as you speak”). This
is so because readers do not make sense of the written word by simply decoding
graphemes as direct representations of individual speech sounds, but, in addi-
tion, by coming over time to recognize the meaning of lexical items as complete
semiotic units. Consequently, if writing can be demonstrated to constitute a sys-
tem in its own right, then to demand that civil servants and pupils, like Gröschner
and his daughter, be obliged to change the system they have previously acquired–
and crucially stored in their “mental lexicon” – amounts to a constitutional breach
of their right to the free development of their personality.
Secondly, Gröschner argued that the spelling reform impinged on his consti-
tutional rights as laid down in Article 5, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, which
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guarantees that “Art and science, research and teaching are free.” Gröschner con-
sidered that this freedom would be curtailed should he not be permitted, in his
capacity as an examiner in state law examinations, to evaluate the new spellings
as incorrect.
Third, Gröschner maintained that the reform contravened his constitutional
rights as specified in Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, which states that the
“Care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the parents and a duty
primarily incumbent on them.” Gröschner went on to argue how, while decrees
on the part of the KMK frequently constituted an adequate means by which to
introduce revisions to school curricula, the current reform was different. Because
his daughter would be learning an orthography fundamentally different from the
one he had learned, the reform impinged on his parental right to educate his
daughter as he wished. He therefore argued that such a conflict of parental au-
thority need not be tolerated without an appropriate parliamentary ruling, that is,
a statutory law as opposed to a ministerial decree. This was reinforced by his
14-year-old daughter, who added that she too considered the spelling reform to be
an infringement of the right to free development of her own personality, since she
would be forced to use spellings other than those she had previously learned at
home and school, and had therefore stored in her “mental lexicon.”
The need perceived by Gröschner and his daughter for a statutory regulation of
orthography is linked to the complex historical question of the relative powers
of the legislature and the executive with respect to the German constitutional mon-
archy of 1901, on the one hand, and the postwar parliamentary democracy of (West)
Germany, on the other. Augst & Strunk 1989 had proposed that the 1901 mode of
implementing an orthographic reform via ministerial decree afforded an appro-
priate precedent for 1996, but this was severely disputed by Gröschner and Kopke
(Gröschner 1997, Gröschner & Kopke 1997, Kopke 1995a, 1995b). Thus, while
control over educational matters in both periods remained primarily in the hands
of the executive (the Länder), Kopke argued that this by no means guaranteed the
equivalence of executive powers in the two historical periods. In fact, he pro-
posed that, under the constitutional monarchy of 1901, the powers of the execu-
tive were significantly greater than in the new republic, for two main reasons. First,
Article 7 of the Basic Law now states: “The entire education system is under the
supervision of the state” (although the definition of both “supervision” and “state”
remains open to interpretation). Second, the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the
state are much more firmly embedded in the current Basic Law than in the 1901
constitution. This means that German citizens are now in a position to demand ac-
tion on the part of the legislature – in other words, the statutory enforcement of ex-
ecutive action – wherever they consider their basic rights to be affected. It is a point
of additional interest that, unlike in 1901, when the rights of civil servants and
school pupils such as Gröschner and his daughter were afforded no protection, this
has not been the case since 1949, when the rights of both groups have been con-
stitutionally guaranteed (see Kopke 1995a:163, 215).
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However, this postwar German model of a federal constitutional democracy
brings with it a crucial dilemma, no doubt familiar to students of the US consti-
tution, which itself afforded the inspiration for the German Basic Law. One of the
main aims of the Basic Law was to rectify the flaws in the Weimar constitution
that had structurally facilitated the seizure of power by the National Socialists in
1933 (see Dürig 1998:ix–xvi). This was to be achieved particularly via Article
20, with its proposition that “All state authority emanates from the people,” and
its guarantee of a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial organs. The
problem here is that structures originally intended as a means of strengthening
the democratic influence of the people against the potentially totalizing forces of
the state simultaneously run the risk of an ever-increasing juridification of social
life, which eventually threatens to stifle political action on the part of the state.
This occurs as citizens repeatedly contest the authority of the executive (in this
case, the KMK) by means of recourse to the judiciary (in this case, the Federal
Constitutional Court) in order to demand action on the part of the legislature (in
this case, either the national or Länder parliaments). It is precisely in an attempt
to avoid such “over-juridification” that there is, in practice, frequent recourse to
the “principle of fundamentality” (Wesentlichskeitsprinzip or -doktrin). This pos-
its that rulings by the legislature, in the form of parliamentary statutes, are re-
quired only in those cases where the decisions to be made are too fundamental
to be left to the executive (Gröschner 1997). The crux of all such disputes then
lies in the specification of what is fundamental.
In a series of constitutional debates over educational issues since 1949, the
principle of fundamentality has generally been interpreted thus: The KMK may
stipulate changes to the content of school curricula by means of decree, provided
that such changes are fairly limited and gradual, affecting only minor curricular
details (so-called Feinlernziele). Where broader, more fundamental pedagogic
aims and objectives (Groblernziele) are affected, action is required on the part of
the legislature. Since the 1970s, a benchmark in this regard has been the extent to
which curricular innovations were thought to have an impact extending beyond
the limited realm of school pupils, thereby potentially impinging on the consti-
tutional rights of citizens in the wider community. This was the case, for example,
in 1977, when changes to the sex education curriculum proposed in Hamburg
were deemed sufficiently to affect the constitutional rights of individuals in the
wider community so as to require a statutory ruling on behalf of the regional
parliament there (see Kopke 1995a:157– 62).
It was Gröschner’s belief that the 1996 reform of German orthography af-
fected broader pedagogic aims and objectives in two main ways (Gröschner 1997).
First, he argued that the reform resulted in an orthography with content funda-
mentally different from that of the previous one. In his view, the 1901 agreement
had not really constituted a reform at all but had simply documented an “organic”
process of language change, whereas the 1996 reform had introduced a number of
previously nonexistent spellings.12 This, he then argued, meant that pupils would
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be required to learn a version of German orthography that was fundamentally
different from the previous one. The second reason concerns the much-disputed
question of the relationship between school curricula and their implications for
the wider community. Here again, Gröschner held the conviction that the 1996
reform would have implications extending beyond schools, thereby affecting the
constitutional rights of the wider population. Not only did Article III of the Vi-
enna Declaration clearly state that the long-term aim of the reform would be to
work toward the preservation of orthographic unity in the whole German-speaking
area; further evidence was provided by the role of the Duden Corporation in
securing the implementation of the reform right across the speech community. All
this underpinned Gröschner’s belief in the need for a statutory ruling on ortho-
graphic reform at either national or Länder level.13
The Court’s response
Section II of the ruling outlines the response of the Constitutional Court, which is
obliged formally to accept constitutional complaints by individuals in conjunc-
tion with two sections of the Law of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgerichtsgesetz or BVerfGG). The first of these, §93a Paragraph 2,
states that complaints can be accepted only where fundamental significance in
terms of constitutional rights can be attached to the disputed measures– and the
Court rejected that such significance was forthcoming in Gröschner’s case. Given
their inadmissibility, the complaints therefore could not be considered in relation
to §90, Paragraph 1, which states that every individual has the right to make a
constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court should he or she believe that
the actions of state authorities have impinged on constitutional rights. The Court
justified its refusal to accept Gröschner’s complaint as follows: For an individual
to be fundamentally affected by a breach of one or more constitutional rights,
he or she must be “personally, currently and directly” affected (II.1). The Court
ruled that this was not the case where Gröschner was concerned and dealt with the
complaints in reverse order.
The first reason for the rejection of Gröschner’s claim that he was directly
affected by the spelling reform referred to the question of parental rights. The
Court ruled that the spelling reform was, at the time of the complaint (May 1996),
limited to a mutual obligation entered into by the Ministers for Education and
Cultural Affairs of the 16 Länder, who would subsequently be responsible for its
actual implementation in schools. However, since at the time of Gröschner’s
complaint that implementation had not yet begun, Gröschner could not yet claim
to be directly affected (II.1.a.aa) – indeed, nobody could. In other words, the
complaint was dismissed because it was prematurely lodged. This legal techni-
cality, not surprisingly, infuriated opponents of the reform, who argued that, by
the time the reform had in fact been introduced, they would be dealing with a fait
accompli, which (as they rightly anticipated) would be even harder to reverse
(see Ickler 1997:136–37).14
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The second reason why the complaint was rejected reflects the requirement –
stipulated in §90, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1 of the Law of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court – that, prior to lodging a complaint, complainants must first have
taken their case to the lower courts and exhausted the requisite legal channels.
However, the same paragraph goes on to state that complainants may proceed
directly to the Constitutional Court should they consider themselves to be se-
verely and unavoidably disadvantaged by first proceeding through the lower courts.
In this case, the Court did not believe that such a disadvantage was forthcoming
and ruled that Gröschner’s complaint was therefore inadmissible.
After stating that the actions of the Standing Conference of Ministers for Ed-
ucation and Cultural Affairs could not be considered to constitute a breach of
parental rights, the Court proceeded to rule that the actions of neither the Stand-
ing Conference of the Prime Ministers of the 16 Länder (Ministerpräsidenten-
konferenz or MPK) nor the Federal government could, for the same reasons, be
considered to affect the complainant directly (II.1.bb). Nor would Gröschner’s
rights be directly impinged on by the signing of the declaration of intent planned
for 1 July 1996 in Vienna (II.1.cc): This declaration, the Court claimed, would
neither function as a legally binding agreement for the Federal Republic, nor
would it directly affect the implementation of the reform. However, as Kopke
(1997:112–13) later argued, this merely highlighted the practical unenforceabil-
ity of the reform, since no legal action could be taken against any country or
Federal state that subsequently failed to secure its implementation.
Finally in this section, the Court dealt with the disputed role played by the
Duden dictionary vis-à-vis the 1996 reform (II.1.dd). The Court thereby reiter-
ated the KMK ruling of 1955 that the 1901 rules remained valid until a further
reform had been implemented, and that only in so-called cases of uncertainty
should reference be made to the supplementary rules contained in the Duden. The
Court ruled that, in those Länder where the reform had not yet been introduced,
any version of the Duden that did not conform to the 1901 guidelines (i.e., one
revised according to the new rules) was not covered by the ruling of 1955 and
therefore disqualified itself from use in the classroom. This meant that, in the
two-year period between 1 August 1996 and 1 August 1998, teachers in the “pre-
reform” Länder would be required to refer to pre-1996 versions of the Duden in
“cases of uncertainty.” In reality, this was what happened, because such “pre-
reform” Länder would not have acquired new, updated dictionaries until the re-
form had actually been introduced; this undermined Gröschner’s argument that
teachers would be obliged to distinguish between the pre- and post-1996 editions
of the Duden during the interim period (see also Menzel 1998:1181).
Having dismissed Gröschner’s assertion that the reform required a statutory
ruling to secure its implementation (and having rejected his daughter’s case on
the same grounds, see II.2), the Court proceeded to address the two remaining
aspects of Gröschner’s complaint. First, the Court rejected outright Gröschner’s
claim that his freedom of teaching would be curtailed, since it did not accept that
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he was either directly affected by the reform or that his duties with regard to state
examinations were embraced by this aspect of the Basic Law (II.1.b). Second, the
Court dismissed Gröschner’s complaint that the reform constitute a breach of his
constitutional right to the free development of his personality (II.1.c), refusing to
accept his suggestion that he would be forced to adopt the new orthography in
order to avoid social embarrassment in the eyes of the speech community. This,
according to the Court, was so because the speech community does not base its
views regarding the correctness of particular spellings specifically on rulings
made by the state. Instead, perceptions of orthographical correctness depend on
those rules that the community itself considers to be binding. The Court there-
fore proposed that those members of the speech community who had already
learned to read and write would not conclude that Gröschner was writing incor-
rectly should he continue to use the old spellings; they would merely assume that
he was adhering to the traditional, as opposed to the revised, rules.
From Gröschner’s perspective, the ruling of the Court arguably missed the
point because, as becomes clear elsewhere, underpinning his complaint is pre-
cisely the fear that the speech community would conclude that he was adhering to
the traditional, pre-reform spellings. Gröschner then argued that, through con-
tinuing to use the old orthography, he would in fact be “outing” himself as “con-
servative” (Gröschner & Kopke 1997:299).15 However, of particular theoretical
interest in this regard is the distinction made by the Court between de jure rulings
on orthographical correctness (i.e., by the state) and de facto perceptions of cor-
rectness (within the speech community), whereby precedence is given to the lat-
ter. In doing so, the Court would appear to have sidestepped the all-important
sociolinguistic question of the relationship between these two spheres and their
relative significance for the individual language user, a point to which I will
return in the next section.
With regard to Gröschner’s alleged breach of his personality rights, the Court
ruled once again that, because the reform had not yet been introduced into schools,
there was no actual basis for a constitutional complaint at that point in time. But
the Court went on to add that, even though the writing practices of the wider
community were unlikely to remain unaffected in the longer term by the partic-
ular version of orthography taught in schools at any one time, the constitution
would never ultimately be in a position to offer the complainant protection
from confrontation with such spellings. In this regard, the comments of the Court
highlight an intriguing paradox. By stating that the Basic Law could not protect
the complainant from new spellings taught in schools, the Court would appear to
be admitting that reforms are in fact potentially fundamental, in the constitu-
tional sense maintained by Gröschner. Clearly, the effects of a reform cannot be
limited to school-aged children and official authorities (over which the KMK has
jurisdiction); they are always intended to percolate through the speech commu-
nity (over which it has none) – an intention clearly stated by the Vienna Decla-
ration. But leaving aside the obvious question as to what the purpose of a school
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education is meant to be, if not to prepare pupils for later life as part of the wider
community (and what are pupils, in any case, if not already a part of that com-
munity?), it is precisely this aspect of the constitutional dispute surrounding the
1996 reform of German orthography that takes us to the heart of the ideological
relationship between the individual, the speech community, and the nation-state.
D I S C U S S I O N
Orthography, ideology and the nation-state
As a branch of language planning, language standardization is closely connected
with the rise of nation-states and the concomitant project of modernity (Joseph
1987, Milroy & Milroy 1999, Kroskrity 2000). Williams (1992:128) describes
how, as part of that project, language itself becomes tied into the evolutionary
view of progress central to modernist thinking. Accordingly, languages and0or
specific varieties of language are objectified and dichotomized into “modern”
versus “traditional” and “developed” versus “less developed,” and, Williams
writes, “The most important of the diacritica of such a typology are literacy and
writing” (1992:128).
The German language was no exception in this regard. Indeed, Durrell
(1999:292–93, 302–3) has noted that the history of standard German is proba-
bly best characterized as the standardization of the written language, or
Schriftdeutsch, whereas the standardization of English drew historically on both
written and spoken usage. Underpinning the comparatively greater emphasis
on written German were a number of factors, including the lack of an obvious
single metropolis or region that might have afforded a spoken model for a
national standard, as London or the Home Counties did for English. These
factors, in turn, relate to the fractured political histories of the German regions,
and they partly account for why language was to take on such an important
symbolic function in the “imagining” of the German Kulturnation – a nation
based on a common cultural heritage as opposed to a shared political history
(see Coulmas 1995:57). They also offer some explanation as to why, following
the relatively late political unification of Germany in 1871, state authorities
would play a more proactive role than their British counterparts in the stan-
dardization of the national language, particularly its written variety (see Dur-
rell 1999:291).
For Williams (1992:20–35), standardization was and is an ideological project,
according to which language is frequently invoked by the state as an instrument
for the socialization of its subjects (see also Blommaert 1996). As a symbol of
both unity and division, language thereby acquires a crucial gatekeeping function
through which membership in the nation-state is not only afforded but also de-
nied. At an inter-national level, this operates via the specification of those in-
dividuals and groups who do or do not have a native command of the national
language, a specification grounded in the Herderian conflation of language, cul-
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ture, and nation, which Blommaert & Verschueren (1998:117– 47) refer to as
“homogeneism.” At an intra-national level, by contrast, such linguistic gate-
keeping works via the setting of a national standard. Here, the specification of
what is “modern” becomes tantamount to a prescription of what is “correct.”
Because the selection of the standard variety is itself ideologically motivated (it
is no coincidence that the 1901 guidelines on orthography were based on usage in
the two largest and most powerful regions of Germany at the time, Prussia and
Bavaria), language emerges as a useful means with which to shore up the interests
of already powerful social, economic, and regional groups, thereby legitimizing
inequality. As Williams (1992:25) points out, a central role in the naturalization
of this disciplinary discourse of language is accorded to education, where the
inculcation of the values associated not just with the usage but especially with
correct usage of the national language becomes “a pedagogical exercise” (see
also Milroy 2001).
However, the pursuit of modernism and the concomitant standardization of
any area of social life raise a fundamental philosophical dilemma with regard
to the authority of the state over its subjects. Central to this dilemma, accord-
ing to Williams (1992:9), is the distinction between what Tönnies referred to as
Gemeinschaft ‘community’, on the one hand, and Gesellschaft ‘society’, on the
other. Tönnies 1887 argued that, following the Renaissance, processes of ur-
banization and industrialization had meant that the Gemeinschaft, with its pri-
mordial ties of friendship and kinship within a “community of fate,” had
gradually been forced to give way to the Gesellschaft, with its complex regu-
latory frameworks superimposed by the state. There are many objections to
this view. Dahrendorf (1968:146– 47), for example, not only describes the
community0society dichotomy as “historically misleading, sociologically un-
informed and politically illiberal” (my translation); he also doubts the very
existence of the idealized version of “community” posited by Tönnies, which
romanticizes the premodern era together with the purportedly “organic” origins
of its regulatory social practices.16 As Williams (1992:10–11) notes, however,
such objections do not render the ideological purchase of the Gemeinschaft/
Gesellschaft distinction less valuable for the emergent nation-state. This is be-
cause “the superimposition of time upon society in such a way that social change
proceeds in a unilinear direction with a degree of inevitability means that Ge-
meinschaft must give way to Gesellschaft, thereby implementing and justify-
ing the state in society” (1992:10, emphasis added). In other words, it is the
very inevitability of the supposed transition from community to society that is
invoked by the state in order to legitimize its intervention into hitherto unreg-
ulated areas of social life.
At this point, the interests of the state would appear to be in direct conflict with
those of the community. Although this arguably underlines the state’s need to
divert the individual away from a dependency on community ties, the dilemma
then becomes one of how to conserve the moral imperative – a sense of right and
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wrong – as forms of social organization become increasingly complex. The prob-
lem is especially vexing given that the nation-state is itself the creation of indi-
vidualism, which necessarily puts a premium on the rights and freedom of the
individual. As Williams notes: “In this sense it is not the state and the community
which are in opposition but the state and the individual” (1992:11). The “solu-
tion,” it seems, lies once again in an invocation by the state of the concept of
Gemeinschaft, this time with its idealized solidarity as a source from which in-
dividuals derive their moral imperative. As Williams (1992:11) concludes, the
objective of the state then becomes that of teaching its subjects to “‘respect the
sacred bond’ of community,” for it is precisely in order to consolidate its own
interests that the state must compel the individual to act as a member of the
community.
On the origin of linguistic norms
The legal dispute over the 1996 reform of German orthography provides a fas-
cinating illustration of the ideological process outlined above. Here, the various
brokers – Gröschner and his daughter, on the one hand, and the judges of the
Federal Constitutional Court, on the other – are engaged in an ideological debate
over who has the right to control the German language. In their respective pursuit
of “authoritative entextualization,” many questions arise about the nature, func-
tion, and origin of orthographic norms. Do such norms originate “organically” as
a result of a moral imperative from within the speech community, or SPRACHge-
meinschaft? Is it legitimate, not to mention desirable, for the state to intervene
actively in the prescription of such norms? What are the implications for– and
rights of – the individual language user within this complex?
The roots of this particular debate lie, as we saw earlier, in the historical de-
velopment of the German language and the decision by the newly founded nation-
state to engage in the formal prescription of orthographic norms at the beginning
of the 20th century. Having laid down a set of standardized guidelines, the Ger-
man state was then confronted with the classic modernist dilemma of how to
reconcile the static quality of a fixed standard with the dynamics of social and
linguistic change. Not only had the 1901 rules crystallized an inevitably imper-
fect snapshot of a standard orthography, itself subject to much dispute at the time;
in addition, orthographic conventions would continue to evolve throughout the
20th century, gradually increasing the state’s need for re-modernization, a pro-
cess for which, crucially, no provision had been made in 1901. The problem was
particularly acute if the efficacy of orthography was to be maintained as a means
of inculcating the value of standard language more generally, especially via ed-
ucation. By the end of the 20th century, a range of discrepancies had arisen be-
tween the official 1901 guidelines and what was perceived to be “current usage” –
disseminated not least via the combined Duden of 1915 and subsequent editions
of the dictionary– and as a result, many schoolteachers were finding the teaching
and evaluation of orthography increasingly frustrating and time-consuming, par-
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ticularly in the early years of schooling, when dictation exercises are still com-
mon. If this disciplinary function of orthography was to be sustained, something
once again had to be done, although the need for restandardization was at no time
framed in such explicitly political terms.
Against this backdrop, it starts to become clear how reaching agreement on the
linguistic aspects of the reform would not be the only problem with which the
state would have to contend (see Augst et al. 1997). Once a new set of guidelines
had been finalized by 1995, it would be their political implementation that
would then be a major headache for the reformers (Scheuringer 1997). Although
the implementation of the 1901 regulations was itself much disputed at the time,
it was clearly not just language that had evolved in the intervening century. Fol-
lowing World War II, the revised constitutional arrangement of the West German
state– and from 1990, that of the newly unified Germany – meant that the rights
of the individual citizen were now much more firmly anchored in the constitu-
tion. This, together with a range of political developments such as the student
protest movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the rise of “citizens’action groups”
(Bürgerinitiativen) in the 1980s, meant that German citizens were not only more
constitutionally able but also perhaps more fundamentally willing to challenge
the authority of the state on a wide range of issues and from a broad spectrum of
political standpoints (Beck 1992, 1995, 1997). Add to this the increased expres-
sion of skepticism toward authority and expertise that is generally thought to
characterize the period now referred to as “late” or “high” modernity (Giddens
1991), and it is clear that the German state was faced with a very different set of
social and political circumstances in which to instigate a process of orthographic
reform (see Antos 1996:238– 49).
Central to the case put forward by Gröschner and his daughter is the dignity of
the individual language user, itself highly dependent on the views of ortho-
graphical correctness held by others within the speech community. What is then
being disputed by the complainants is the right of the state to take action that
upsets the purported balance of consensus within that community, thereby im-
pinging on the dignity of the individual. There is, of course, some irony in this
line of argument. Given their familiarity with the historical complexities sur-
rounding the reform, Gröschner and his daughter must have been aware that the
orthographic norms that obtained within the speech community before 1996 were
at least partly the product of state intervention in the form of regulations for
schools since the mid-19th century, culminating in the guidelines of 1901, along
with the state sanctioning of the Duden in 1955. And familiar with the discussions
in Kopke’s thesis (1995a:294–371), they will have understood that at the root of
the debate over orthographic reform is its use by schools as a means of disciplin-
ing pupils. However, it is interesting that at no point in the case presented to the
Constitutional Court was this particular function of orthography under dispute.
On the contrary, a cornerstone of Gröschner’s argument was his claim that the
reform would actually undermine his own personal authority over his daughter
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and the students whose examinations he marked. At a more abstract level, it is
possible to characterize Gröschner’s views as very much in accordance with the
model outlined by Williams above: As an individual, Gröschner is convinced that
he takes his moral imperative not from the state but from within the speech com-
munity; yet in his role as a parent and university professor, he actively and will-
ingly participates in the dissemination within the speech community of what
might be seen as a state-sanctioned ideology of standard orthography via the
education of those in his charge.
Of course, it was precisely in order to maintain the disciplinary function sur-
rounding orthography that the state was now obliged to modernize the guidelines
of 1901. But whereas processes of modernization typically serve to consolidate
the social, economic, and cultural capital of already powerful groups, this par-
ticular process was one in which Gröschner and his daughter presumably feared
they stood to lose. Accepting the premise that spelling errors are commonly taken
to be an indicator of low intelligence by the speech community, the two now
considered themselves to be vulnerable should they adhere to the pre-reform
spellings. It was a threat of social marginalization that they were willing to con-
test with all the constitutional force they could muster. But however radical the
form of their protest might appear, there was little that was radical in its content:
This protest in no way challenged the more general ideological function under-
pinning the standardization of orthography. Theirs was a defense of tradition,
albeit a tradition that was itself once modern. It was, moreover, a defense that
invoked– and arguably romanticized – the organic solidarity of the speech com-
munity and pitted this against a more mechanical form of regulation imposed by
the state.
We saw earlier that wherever German citizens consider actions by third parties
to have impinged on their rights as laid down in the Basic Law, it is their consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to contest those actions, first via the lower and upper
administrative courts and then, if necessary, via the Constitutional Court. In such
cases, it is the remit of the Constitutional Court to mediate between the various
parties and, as Dürig (1998:xvi–xvii) describes in his introduction to the Basic
Law, there are three important elements to that process. First, it is the fundamen-
tal task of the Court to protect the constitutional order on which the state is
founded.17 Second, the protection of that constitutional order is to be achieved by
allowing conflicts to surface rather than by repressing them. Third, the Court
aims to resolve such conflicts via a process of depoliticization.
The impossibility of depoliticizing what is an inherently political conflict is
clear. Although the judges of the Court did not address the ideological functions
of orthography that lie at the heart of the dispute, they nonetheless engaged in a
crucial piece of ideological brokerage on behalf of the state, much in line with the
process characterized by Williams above. In order to justify the right of the state
to prescribe orthographic norms by ministerial decree, the Court dismissed the
significance of the reform for the wider speech community. Yet at the same time,
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the success of state action – i.e., the reform – is self-evidently dependent on the
compliance of that community. The Court therefore tried to reassure Gröschner
that the speech community would not think less highly of him for his continued
use of the traditional orthography, because the speech community allegedly bases
its views of orthographic correctness not on the norms prescribed de jure by the
state, but on the norms acknowledged de facto by the speech community. In doing
so, the Court – just like the complainants – invoked the idealized solidarity of the
speech community as the source of the individual’s moral imperative. This, how-
ever, is a potentially contradictory line of argumentation that merely lends cre-
dence to the complainants’original assertion that the 1996 reform of orthography
might indeed be of fundamental significance for the wider speech community in
the sense maintained by Gröschner.
C O N C L U S I O N
Following the rejection of the complaints brought by Gröschner and his daugh-
ter in 1996, many parents of school-aged children challenged the reform in the
lower and upper administrative courts of various German Länder. Altogether,
about 30 cases were heard, with just over half going in favor of the reform.18
In May 1998, the case was referred back to the Federal Constitutional Court
for a final hearing based on a set of complaints broadly similar to those of
Gröschner and his daughter, this time put forward by Thomas Elsner and Gunda
Diercks-Elsner, the parents of two children of primary-school age in the state
of Schleswig-Holstein (see Bundesverfassungsgericht 14 July 1998). Having
already exhausted the requisite legal channels, and given that the reform had
actually been introduced in Schleswig-Holstein and elsewhere, the complaints
were this time formally accepted for a hearing by the Constitutional Court.19
Once again, the complaints were rejected. The Court argued, inter alia, that it
did not accept that a reform affecting only 0.5% of the written language consti-
tuted a fundamental intervention into the broader pedagogic aim of teaching pu-
pils to read and write, thereby impinging on the constitutional rights of either
pupils or their parents in any fundamental way. Although the Court conceded that
the reform was certainly of general relevance for the wider speech community,
it noted that such relevance did not in itself render the reform unconstitutional;
complainants must be able to show that the changes affected in a fundamental
way the basic rights of individuals within that community and, again, no such
impact was apparent. The Court therefore upheld the right of the executive to
implement the reform and did not deem involvement of the legislature to be
necessary.
As Rivers & Young (2001:176–77) have proposed in a legal and linguistic
assessment of the 1998 ruling, the decision of the Constitutional Court might well
be seen as a sensible and pragmatic attempt to avoid the further juridification of
orthographic norms, combined with a healthy degree of agnosticism regarding
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the vexed question of who exactly controls the German language. They note,
nonetheless, the unsatisfactory nature of the ruling concerning the reform’s im-
plications for the wider speech community. Here, the Court reiterated that, out-
side of schools and official authorities, people were free to continue writing as
they wished. Although this is technically true, once the Court admitted conse-
quences of a sort for the wider community, tradition dictates that the Court
should then at least have addressed the constitutional issues thereby raised. But it
did not: It simply dismissed the implications of the reform for the speech com-
munity as an irrelevance (Rivers & Young 2001:177).
I would argue that there is good reason for this. As I have shown throughout
this essay, even though the successful implementation of the reform in the long
term will clearly depend on the cooperation of the wider speech community, its
successful enforcement in the short term was equally dependent on the margin-
alization of that role. This is so because, while schools and state authorities are
under the jurisdiction of the executive, the wider speech community is not. Al-
though it is crucial to emphasize that the Constitutional Court was in no way
obliged to side with the state on this or any other matter, once it began seriously
to explore the question of whether the constitutional rights of those outside of
schools and state authorities were in any way affected, it would at some point
have been obliged to address the crucial question of the reform’s overall purpose
in respect to individual speakers within the wider speech community. However, it
is difficult to see how this could have been achieved within the Court’s own remit
of depoliticizing conflict situations, and without ultimately exploring the politi-
cal and ideological dimensions of the standardization process per se. In the final
analysis, the Court therefore bypassed one of the most important questions sur-
rounding the reform by simply ignoring it. However, the fact that the judges were
in a position to ignore such a crucial question was ultimately contingent on the
power with which the Court is invested by the state. And therein, no doubt, lies
the ability of many an ideological broker to reproduce a dominant language ide-
ology and to secure “authoritative entextualization” in a language ideological
debate.20
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1 C.f. Schiffmann (1998:368), in the context of a discussion of the (re-)standardization of spoken
Tamil, argues: “These days it is fashionable, in many circles in the West, to deny both the existence
and legitimacy of standard English or other standard languages – because standards have often been
used capriciously and maliciously, to deny non-standard speakers access to power. Therefore, we now
hear and see a great deal about hegemony, power imbalance, linguistic prejudice, maintenance0denial
of privilege, empowerment, and many other allusions to ideological control of language.” Although
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Schiffman is right to point out that standards may serve important functions in terms of securing the
communicative effectiveness of a given language (e.g., in foreign-language pedagogy), he under-
mines his own “anti-ideological” line of argumentation when he points out: “The fact is that, when all
is said and done, speakers of natural languages make judgments about different kinds of speech and
writing of which they hear and see samples, and some of those judgments are, like it or not, hierar-
chical social judgments” (1998:369). As I see it, the underlying premise of work on language ideol-
ogies and language ideological debates lies not in some kind of politically motivated disregard for
sociolinguistic processes such as standardization (as implied by Schiffman), but in this work as a
means of deepening our understanding of precisely such processes via a more holistic account of the
relationship between the relevant linguistic and social factors (see Milroy 2001 for a similar line of
argument).
2 See Fix (1994:25–74) for a critical discussion of the historical relationship between the stan-
dardization of orthography, the implementation of planned curricula, and the increasing use of dic-
tation as a means of teaching and evaluating literacy.
3 Parallel to the state codification of orthographic norms was the specification of the spoken
standard (see Siebs 1898). For an interesting comparative discussion of the ensuing standardization of
the legal and orthographic traditions in the different regions before and after unification in the 19th
century, see Meder 1997.
4 Some changes were nonetheless agreed, among others (i) the abolition of ^h& in words of Ger-
man origin such as ThürrTür ‘door’; (ii) the use of ^k& or ^z& to replace ^c& in foreign loans, e.g.
ClasserKlasse and MedicinrMedizin; and (iii) the reduction of ^aa& to ^a& in words such as
WaagenrWagen ‘car’. Not included, however, was the recommendation of 1876 to abolish post-
vocalic ^h& in items such as Sohn ‘son’, Huhn ‘chicken’, or Gefühl ‘feeling’ (see Protokoll 1901).
5 There has been much speculation on why these discrepancies occurred. Sauer (1988:103) sug-
gests a number of reasons, such as the speed with which the 1901 guidelines were incorporated into
the seventh edition of the dictionary, which appeared in 1902, allowing insufficient time for proof-
reading. Also, the needs of printers, who had little desire for optional variability, were an obvious
influence on Duden’s subsequent actions. Later, deviations from the 1901 guidelines tended to be
justified by the claim that the Duden was merely documenting actual usage within the speech
community.
6 An article in the newspaper Die Zeit (23 February 1973), for example, suggested that three-
quarters of all children made to repeat school years were forced to do so because of their spelling
(cited in Clyne 1995:181–82). For a critical discussion of the role of dictation as a means of disci-
plining schoolchildren, see Jäger 1974. An empirical investigation highlighting the negative impact
of dictation on the overall achievement of working-class pupils can be found in Rigol 1977. For a
broader critical discussion of the teaching of spelling, see Spitta 1977.
7 Similar arrangements were made in Switzerland and Austria. This article, however, focuses on
the implementation procedures and surrounding disputes within Germany.
8 For complete text, see Deutsche Rechtschreibung 1996, a summary of which is available in
Heller 1998. For a brief description and discussion in English, see Johnson 2000. It was also agreed
that a new Commission for German Orthography (Kommission für die deutsche Rechtschreibung),
based at the state-funded Institute for German Language (Institut für deutsche Sprache – IdS) in
Mannheim, would be established,with the specific remit of overseeing the introduction of the reform,
monitoring future developments in German orthography, and making further gradual revisions.
9 References are to specific parts of the document, e.g., section I.2.aa or I.1c.9.
10 This does, in fact, sideline the issue that by 1996 many other revised dictionaries would also be
available, including that of Duden’s main rival, Bertelsmann. In this regard, Gröschner has been
widely criticized for overestimating the significance of the Duden dictionary in the reform process, as
well as the role played by its editors (see e.g., Zabel 1996:359– 60; Hufeld 1996:1076). But whether
those other dictionaries could ever really compete on a level playing field with the Duden, given the
latter’s long-term position of authority, was and still is open to debate, and it was Gröschner’s belief
that the Duden was seen by the population as authoritative in questions of orthography, which was
central to his argument.
11 Most schoolteachers and university professors in Germany have civil-servant status, hence
Gröschner’s recognition that he would be formally obliged to conform to the new guidelines on
orthography in his professional correspondence, and the concomitant emphasis here on his private
correspondence.
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12 Gröschner is referring here to the creation of previously nonexistent spellings, such as Känguru
(formerly Känguruh ‘kangaroo’), where the final ^h& was dropped in order to bring it in line with items
such as Gnu. See Mentrup 1998 for a comprehensively illustrated rejection of Gröschner’s contention
that the 1901 guidelines did not make fundamental changes to German orthography at the time; see
also my note 4.
13 There has been some confusion in the literature as to what kind of legislative action was being
demanded by the opponents of the reform. Menzel (1998:1183) points out, for example, that such
action need not have involved the detailed specification of standard orthographic rules on the part of
the state, merely a parliamentary ruling clarifying responsibility for such issues (see also Bundesver-
fassungsgericht 14 July 1998:236).
14 It is important to note here that there is in fact constitutional provision for bringing complaints
in advance of the implementation of disputed measures. This is possible where the measures in
question will be implemented in the very near future and will lead to circumstances that will no longer
be rectifiable (Gersdorf 2000:10) – both of which arguably applied here.
15 Nor does the Court ruling engage with the psycholinguistic dimension of the complaint, which
sees the reform as a potential breach of the complainants’ right to the free development of their
personalities in the light of its alleged impact on the spelling system already stored in their “mental
lexica.” I am grateful to one of the anonymous readers of this paper for drawing this to my attention.
16 Dahrendorf (1968:145) describes the threat of the demise of the “community” as a result of the
artificially imposed structures of the “state” as part of the “folklore of German political conscious-
ness” (my translation). Although it is certainly true that the dichotomy has been drawn on at several
key points in German history – Hitler, for example, promised to bring to an end the political upheavals
of the Weimar era by appealing to the idea of the German-speaking peoples as members of a “com-
munity of fate” or Schicksalsgemeinschaft – I will refrain from entering into a discussion here of
whether the invocation of the purported solidarity of the Gemeinschaft within the debate over or-
thography is in any way “typically German.”
17 It is important to note here that German schoolteachers and university professors, when taking
up civil servant status, are required to sign a declaration of loyalty to the constitution (see note 11).
18 Two further petitions for temporary injunctions against the reform were also rejected by the
Federal Constitutional Court in December 1997 (see 1 BvR 2368/97 and 1 BvR 2264/97). For a survey
of the regional rulings, see Menzel 1998.
19 In an added twist, the couple actually withdrew their case two weeks before the release of the
Court’s ruling, arguing that the decision was already known to the press. The Court, however, justi-
fied its decision to go ahead with the ruling given the “general relevance” of the case for the public
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 14 July 1998:242– 43).
20 The 1998 ruling did not in fact signal the end of the legal dispute. In September 1998, voters in
the state of Schleswig-Holstein elected in a referendum to opt out of the reform (see Johnson 1999 for
discussion). This was followed in July 1999 by an unsuccessful petition to halt the implementation of
the referendum result, brought before the Constitutional Court by parents who claimed that their
children would be disadvantaged by being taught the old rules when pupils elsewhere in the German-
speaking areas were learning the new ones (see Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BVQ 10099). In Sep-
tember 1999, the result of the referendum was overturned by the regional parliament of Schleswig-
Holstein, and pupils once again began learning the new orthographic rules. Despite an unsuccessful
constitutional challenge by anti-reform groups in November 1999 (see Bundesverfassungsgericht 2
BVR 1958099), at the time of this writing the constitutional legitimacy of the decision to overturn the
referendum result remains unclear (see Rivers & Young 2001:176).
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